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DR BACA : DYNAMIC ROLE BASED ACCESS 
CONTROL FOR ANDROID 
FELIX ROHRER 
ABSTRACT 
Android, as an open platform, dominates the booming mobile market. However, its 
permission mechanism is inflexible and often results in over-privileged applications. 
This in turn creates severe security issues. Aiming to support the Principle of Least 
Privilege, we propose a Dynamic Role Based Access Control for Android (DR BACA) 
model and implement the DR BACA system to address these problems. Our system 
offers multi-user management on Android mobile devices, comparable to traditional 
workstations, and provides fine-grained Role Based Access Control (RBAC) to en-
hance Android security at both the application and permission level. Moreover, by 
leveraging context-aware capabilities of mobile devices and Near Field communication 
(NFC) technology, our solution supports dynamic RBAC that provides more flexible 
access control while still being able to mitigate some of the most serious security risks 
on mobile devices. The DR BACA system is highly scalable, suitable for both end-
users and large business environments. It simplifies configuration and management of 
Android devices and can help enterprises to deal with security issues by implementing 
a uniform security policy. We show that our DR BACA system can be deployed and 
used with e et:se. With a p roper security policy, our evaluation shows tha t DR BACA 
can effectively mitigate the security risks posed by both malicious and vulnerable 
non-malicious applications while incurring only a small overall system overhead. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1 
Mobile devices are the emerging new platform in recent years . They are now bei.ng 
used in many different environments. Because of their pervasiveness, mobile devices 
are changing the traditional IT environment in enterprises. Smartphones with the 
open platform Android operating system are especially skyrocketing in numbers. A 
report published by Gartner (Gartner, 2012) states that not only did Smartphone sales 
increase by 47% compared to 2011, but that Android based smartphones now make up 
72.4% of the entire mobile device sales in 2012. With the rise of Android 's popularity, 
the malware community has also started paying attention and devised many different 
attacks to generate revenue from smartphones and putting end-users and businesses 
into danger. According to a report by McAfee (McAfee-Labs , 2012), mobile malware 
increased by 700% with almost 85% attacks targeting Android smartphones since 
2011. As mobile devices are being widely deployed in corporations , and BYOD (bring 
your own device) is becoming a popular trend , this tremendous increase of Android 
malware raises many concerns. 
While the popularity and openness of the Android platform contribute to this mal-
ware increase, the way Android handles security is another reason for the t remendous 
increase in malware. In particular, Android's permission model has been addressed 
by various research groups such as (Bugiel et al., 2011a), (Enck et al. , 2009) and (Felt 
et al., 2012). While the Android permission model 's intention is to provide better 
security when accessing sensitive resources (GPS, WiFi) and functions (sending an 
2 
SMS) , its "install-time all or nothing" mechanism leaves many applications vulnera-
ble and over-privileged for most of their running time. Also , many developers handle 
these permissions with little care, thereby leaving applications even more vulnerable. 
Malicious applications can directly use dangerous permissions, such as sending an 
SMS to a premium number , or launch a p ermission re-delegation attack by cheat-
ing another application into performing this job. Over-privileged applications can 
therefore inadvertently be used to execute malicious code. 
We argue that one of the fundamental problems of Android 's permission model is , 
that it does not conform well to the Principle of Least Privilege (PLP). Role Based 
Access Control (RBAC) is a widely used approach to support PLP by restricting 
resource access to authorized users based on their roles. How this approach can be 
applied to mobile systems such as Android devices is still an open issue. We propose a 
Dynamic Role Based Access Control for Android (DR BACA) model and implement 
DR BACA to extend the current Android permission model with RBAC in order to 
enhance Android security. Though· DR BACA is not the first solution to apply RBAC 
on Android, it is done in a novel and better way that enhances the Android system 
with the following capabilities: 
• Enable multi-user functionality. DR BACA offers multi-user management 
on Android mobile systems comparable to traditional workstations. It allows a 
single Android device to be used by different people without interference. At 
the same time, a single user can use different devices seamlessly. 
• Provide static RBAC at both the application and permission level. 
DR BACA provides fine-grained access control at both the application and 
p ermission level for any user thereby enhancing Android security. Aiming to 
support PLP, DR BACA helps mitigate the risk of malicious applications exe-
cuting sensitive functions in the background and reduces the risk of permission 
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re-delegation attacks. 
• Offer dynamic RBAC with more flexibility. DR BACA offers finer-grained 
and more flexible access control than standard Android controls by taking ad-
vantage of the unique context-aware capabilities of mobile devices, as well as 
embracing the Near Field Communication (NFC) technology available to An-
droid. 
• Highly Scalable. DR BACA can be used for both single-user environments 
as well as large corporate environments by providing easy configuration and 
management options, which allow one to easily distribute a uniform security 
policy to all involved Android devices. This reduces management efforts for 
environments with many mobile devices. 
Thesis Statement: Due to the tremendous increase in Android malware , finer-
grained access control should be used to limit what mobile users are allowed to do and 
to minimize potential malicious behavior. One solution to achieve this is to integrate 
the Android permission model with role-based access control while taking advantage 
of the mobility feature of mobile systems to provide dynamic role based access control. 
Thesis Outline: Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the Android Operating 
System as well as the security model employed by Android. It t hen talks about 
potential attack vectors on Android devices. Chapter 3 introduces the model of our 
proposed security solution by explaining the different features provided by DR BACA. 
Chapter 4 talks in detail about DR BACA's architecture and its components. It covers 
context management in a separate section because of its importance. The chapter 
concludes with some of DR BACA's own security features. Chapter 5 examines 
the implementation of DR BACA and provides information as to what files had to 
be modified or created in order for t he solution to work together with the Android 
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framework. After having explained the model, the system and the implementation of 
DR BACA, Chapter 6 provides two scenarios to show the usefulness of DR BACA in 
real world environments. Chapter 7 analyzes our solution and argues , that DR BACA 
incurs negligible performance overhead. In Chapter 8, we discuss related work and 
how our own solution differentiates itself. Chapter 9 briefly indicates some possible 
future work. Finally, we draw our conclusion in Chapter 10. 
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Chapter 2 
Android Operating System Overview 
This chapter provides a high-level overview of the Android operating system. We 
cover the basics of Android 's architecture , discuss the internal components and the 
life cycle of Android applications. We then look at Android's own security features 
and its potential shortcomings. 
2.1 Android Architecture 
Any Android introduction would not be complete without the often cited illustration 
shown in Figure 2·1 from (Android, 2013). It shows the main components of the 
Android operating system. 
Figure 2·1: Android architecture 
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The lowest layer consists of a modified Linux kernel. Two components unique to 
Android should be mentioned here: first, the Binder driver provides a way for ap-
plications to safely communicate with each other. Second, the so-called OOM (out-
of-memory) killer , which by the way has been adopted by the official Linux kernel 
development, that tries to prevent the system from running out of memory by killing 
selected processes ahead of time. The software in this layer is mainly written in C 
and C++. 
In the next higher layer, one can find the native libraries and services as well as 
the Dalvik Virtual machine (DVM). The DVM runs compiled application code very 
similarly to how the Java Virtual machine runs Java byte-code. In Section 2.5 , we 
will discuss the DVM in more detail. 
The application framework layer is where the majority of the Android OS is imple-
mented. This layer provides applications with an API to lower-level sensors (i.e. CPS , 
WiFi) and functions such as telephony and data storage. While the entire Android 
OS consists of about 13 million lines of code, the Android framework amounts for a 
massive 8 million lines of code spread out in about 11 ,000 files based on Android 's 
source code version 4.0.4 downloaded from (Coogle, 2013a). 
The highest layer is the application layer and is home to all the applications that 
are downloaded from Coogle Play or third-party application markets (App-Markets). 
These applications are mainly written in J ava, however there are conversion tools for 
different languages such as C#. This layer also includes certain system applications 
provided by Coogle and device manufacturers such as the standard browser , calendar 
and the phone application. However , these system applications often have higher 
privileges than standard applications and should therefore be seen as part of the 
application framework layer. 
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2.2 Android Applications 
In order to understand the coming sections, it is important to have a general idea of 
the components and life cycle of Android applications. 
2.2.1 Components 
An Android application consists of different components, of which there are four 
types: 
• Activity is an interface in the form of a window or screen that allows users 
to interact with an application. Normally, an application contains several Ac-
tivities. Figures 2·2a and 2·2b show two Activities belonging to the Contacts 
application. 
• Service is similar to an Activity but does not provide any screen with which the 
user can interact with. A service is normally used for long-running background 
tasks such as playing music or periodically checking emails. 
• Content provider provides developers an interface for storing data in a rela-
tional database based on sqlite. If the database is exposed, other applications 
can also access that database. 
• Broadcast receiver is listening for specific broadcasts. For example, an ap-
plication may format incoming SMS in a certain way. The Android OS sends 
a 'SMS_RECEIVED' broadcast whenever an SMS arrives. In order to receive 
that notification, the application needs to create a Broadcast receiver listening 
for the 'SMS_RECEIVED' broadcast. 
2.2.2 Life Cycle 
Different than traditional desktop applications, an Android application is normally 
not terminated once a user exits the application (i.e. by pressing the Home button, 
No contacts . 
Create a new contact 
Sign in to an account 
lmporVexport 
contacts 
(a) Activity one 
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F igure 2·2: Contact application activities 
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it will be cached and is still running in the background. This mechanism makes the 
mobile device much more reactive because previously used applications do not need 
to go through a startup process again. There are two ways to terminate an Android 
application: first, the user can explicitly request to stop an application in the Settings 
application. Second, the in Section 2.1 mentioned out-of-memory component chooses 
to terminate a given application due to a shortage of memory. 
We mention the Android life cycle here , because it has an effect on the overall 
security of Android devices . Primarily, this means that a vulnerable application can 
be exploited even if it is not actively used by the user , effectively increasing the 
duration of possible attack time for malicious applications . 
2.3 System Applications and Services 
System applications and services refer to high privileged components of the Android 
operating system. They are considered to be part of the Android application frame-
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work layer, because most of them perform system critical functions. 
2.3.1 System Applications 
System applications such as Phone, Contacts and Camera are different from standard 
applications. One important difference is that users are not allowed to uninstall sys-
tem applications. Also, they cannot be downloaded from an external App-Market but 
are compiled together with the Android operating system. The DRBaca Application 
discussed in Section 5.4 is implemented as a system application. 
2.3.2 System Services 
System services are started at boot time and run as long as the mobile device is 
turned on. These services have important responsibilities such as managing power 
consumption or providing a notification manager for Android applications. Because of 
their importance to the Android system, most system services run with root privileges. 
The DRBacaService introduced in Section 5.2 is implemented as a system service and 
is a central part of our proposed solution. 
2.4 Android Sensors 
The security solution we propose in this thesis makes use of several sensors that 
are part of most Android devices. In particular, we use the provided GPS sensor 
to determine the mobile device's current location. Coogle's location service provides 
another way to determine the devices current location by gathering data from different 
sources such as WiFi and mobile networks. For our solution, a second important 
sensor is the Near Field Communication (NFC) sensor which allows mobile devices 
to either directly communicate with each other or retrieve information from so called 
NFC tags. As the name implies, NFC works over very short distances (a maximum 1.6 
inches). As opposed to wireless networks, the connection to another NFC device or 
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tag happens automatically without the user having to explicitly request connection 
establishment. In subsequent sections , we will explain in detail how our solution 
makes use of this technology. 
2.5 Android Security Model 
Android was designed with security in mind as each application has its own user 
id. Furthermore, each application runs in its own instance of the Dalvik Virtual 
machine , essentially creating a sandbox environment. This prevents applications 
from interacting with each other. However , since preventing communication between 
different applications would be too restrictive , Android offers controlled ways for 
inter-application communication via the Binder IPC component. 
2.5.1 Inter-Application Communication 
An application (or more precisely its components such as Activities or Services) can 
communicate with other installed applications by sending a message called an intent. 
An intent is simply a message containing information about what the receiver is sup-
posed to do. The receiver will listen for particular intents. This is done through 
intent filters. These filters specify, what kind of messages (intents) an activity or a 
service accepts. Creating secure intents and intent filters can sometimes be challeng-
ing and many developers do not spend enough time securing this potential attack 
surface , resulting in vulnerable applications. One of the major problems with intents 
is that intents sent to external applications are defined the same way as intents sent 
to another component in the same application. This leads to misconfigured intents 
and intent filters which allows external applications to gain unauthorized access to 
an applications internal data and functionality. 
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2.5.2 Permissions 
When it comes to permission mechanisms, mobile device operating syst ems generally 
adopt one of two possibilities (or a combination of both): install-time permission 
m echanisms ask t he user during the installation process, if a set of permissions should-
be granted or not. Whereas time-of-use permission mechanisms ask t he user for a 
certain permission when the permission is required to fulfill a certain task. Figure 
2·3a (ThreatSolut ions, 2012) and Figure 2·3b (Apple, 2012) show examples of both 
mechanisms. 
~ I Don't Allow OK I 
-------------------' 
(a) Android: install-t ime (b) iOS: t ime-of-use 
Figure 2·3: Different permission request approaches 
The Android developers decided to go with the first opt ion, while iOS (mostly) follows 
a time-of-use policy. The advantage of install-time permission requests is t hat t he 
user is not bothered wit h permission requests after t he inst allation . However , because 
a user cannot selectively accept or reject request ed permissions, and an application 
seldom requires all granted permissions at the same time, the majority of Android 
applications are over-privileged for most of their running t ime. This is no problem 
as long as t he applications are secure. But if an application is vulnerable to at tacks, 
t hen a malicious application might be able escalate its own permissions t hrough that 
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vulnerable application. 
2.6 Potential Attacks 
This section introduces several attack vectors that have been and are still being used 
to gain unprivileged access to resources and functionality. Many of these att acks are 
discussed in more detail in (Felt et al. , 2011), (Felt and Wagner , 2011), (Wei et al. , 
2012) and (Davi et al. , 2011). In addition , most of the related research work discussed 
in Chapter 8 aim to mitigate a subset of these attacks. 
2.6.1 Permission Re-delegation (PRD) 
A malicious application that performs a PRD attack delegates a request for a per-
mission to another application. Figure 2·4 illustrates this attack. 
A: Malicious App B: Vulnerable App 
I no permissions I Send SMS )Ia I SEND_SMS I 
~ ~ & Accepted ••• . 
~1 t~ Q) · -lfl Q)
a:: 
~11! Application layer 
a; ~ Framework layer 
lfl u 
<( 
L..J L..J 
checkPermission(A. SEND_SMS) checkPermission(B. SEND_SMS) 
Android Reference Monitor 
Figure 2·4: Permission re-delegation attack 
The malicious application A did not request any permission at install- time. Therefore, 
a direct request to send an SMS will result in a rejection because Android 's reference 
monitor (responsible for permission enforcement ) will check if A has been granted the 
SEND_SMS permission . This is not the case and the request will be rejected. 
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However, A can send an intent to application B which happens to listen for these 
kind of intents. B does not appropriately check the permissions of A , accepting any 
intent it receives. This is the actual vulnerability which A exploits. B then forwards 
the request to the reference monitor which in turn verifies that B is allowed to send 
SMS. Since this is true, the SMS will be successfully sent. Depending on how the 
intent was initially requested, B will notify A that the request has been fulfilled . 
2.6.2 Activity Spoofing 
The way Android handles applications makes it trivial for a malicious application to 
spoof another application 's activity. In the process of researching Android security, 
we created a proof of concept application that can spoof several applications such as 
Bank of America, Skype, Facebook and others. The attack works as follows : The 
malicious application is essentially a trojan horse disguised as a game. It only re-
quests the INTERNET permission. Since most games require this permission, this 
will not cause suspicion. Once the user starts this application , a background service 
is launched which repeatedly (i.e. every lOms) polls the currently running applica-
tions. Surprisingly, this functionality is provided by the Android API and is not even 
protected through a permission label. As previously discussed, services are invisible 
to the user and keep running in the background, even after the user closes the ap-
plication. If the user now starts any of the applications targeted by the malicious 
application (i.e. Skype), the malicious application will realize this almost immedi-
ately and start its own activity that looks almost exactly like Skype. Because our 
spoofed version of Skype started a little bit later than the genuine application, the 
spoofed version will be shown to the user first and the user will then enter his/her 
user credentials into the spoofing version of the application activity. After logging 
the user credentials , the malicious application will then popup an error message like 
" Use'rname or password incorrect" and terminate. At this point , the user will now see 
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the genuine Skype application and re-enter the credentials, believing to have mistyped 
the first time. The malicious application will then send the collected credentials over 
the Internet. Figure 2·5a shows the fake Skype activity, while Figure 2·5b shows the 
genume one. 
• 
~~--· -r -- ·-
S e Name 
Sign in 
Create an account 
(a) Fake Skype (b) Real Skype 
Figure 2·5: Fake and real Skype application 
The difference between the above two Figures is difficult to detect. 
2.6.3 Rootkits 
A rootkit allows a malicious entity to retain access to a system, while hiding its 
existence by modifying system utilities. For example, Linux rootkits often modify 
the ps and top commands (among others) in order to hide itself from users and 
administrators. 
One of the most prominent rootkits for Android was a mal ware called DroidDream 
(Svajcer, 2011). This trojan horse obtained root privileges through two software bugs 
and sent personal information to a Command& Control ( C&C) server. DroidDream ef-
fectively created a botnet using mobile devices. In order to stay stealthy, DroidDream 
15 
only communicated with the C&C server between llpm to Sam which explains the 
name researchers gave that particular malware. It is likely that mobile device based 
botnets will become a major problem, simply due to the fact that there are are now 
millions of high performance mobile devices in circulation. 
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Chapter 3 
DR BACA Model 
A natural way of mitigating over-privileged applications (or users) is to make use of an 
access control model which adheres to the Principle of Least Privilege, as discussed in 
(Sandhu and Samarati, 1994), (Provos et al., 2003) and (Chen and Crampton, 2007). 
One very popular model that achieves this is the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
model as noted by the work of (Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992) and (Sandhu et al., 1996). 
We propose a Dynamic Role Based Access Control for Android (DR BACA) model 
to enhance Android security, with a particular focus on environments with a large 
number of mobile devices. 
Figure 3·1 shows the basic elements of the DR BACA model and how they are 
associated with each other. As in the traditional RBAC model, users are assigned to 
a set of roles. In DR BACA, these roles are then associated with privileges defined 
by a set of rules. These associations are all many-to-many. Our model enables 
multiple users to share mobile devices. By associating rules with both applications 
and Android permissions, we integrated Android's permission model with a static 
RBAC model to provide fine-grained access control. Furthermore, DR BACA provides 
dynamic RBAC through context-aware rules and sharable rules to provide flexible 
control for mobile security. 
17 
D Static Access Control 
D Dynamic Access Control 
Figure 3·1: DR BACA model overview 
3.1 Multi-User Enabled 
One may argue that current mobile devices are mostly designed as single user devices 
and there is no need for multi-user capable devices. However, as t he computer power 
of mobile devices improves and their business uses widen, we predict that it is only a 
matter of time until smartphones are expected to offer user management comparable 
to computer desktops. Actually, Android version 4.2, called Jelly Bean, offers a 
feature to manage different users on the same device(Google, 2012). However , the 
access control mechanisms are more limited than what DR BACA is able to provide. 
We believe that user management on mobile devices can be particularly useful in 
a corporate environment. For example, a hospital may provide smartphones to its 
employees to support their daily interact ions. A single device may be used by different 
people at various time periods. In addition, a user may want to be able to log into 
different devices. Our proposed DR BACA model can be used to implement an 
organization level security policy in order to provide uniform access control for all 
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users on any mobile devices. 
3.2 Static Role Based Access Control 
In a traditional RBAC system, roles are normally directly assigned to permissions. 
DR BACA introduces an additional layer between roles and permissions , which we 
call rules. A rule is defined as a 6-tuple (ruleLabel, allowed, shareable , P , A , C) as 
explained in Table 3.1: 
ruleLabel Unique name of this rule. 
allowed A flag to indicate if it is a granting (T) or denying (F) rule 
shareable A flag to indicate if the rule is shareable (T or F) 
P The Permission set {p1 ,p2 , ... ,pn} assigned to this rule 
A The Application set {a1 ,a2 , ... ,an} assigned to this rule 
C Context set { c1 , c2 , ... , Cn} assigned to this rule 
Table 3.1: DR BACA rule syntax 
Rules allow DR BACA to define both static and dynamic permissions. By associating 
rules with both applications and permissions, DR BACA provides both levels of 
access control. An application is simply an object that uniquely identifies a given 
Android application. The permissions are objects that uniquely identify each Android 
permission, both documented and undocumented ones. At the application level , DR 
BACA can allow or reject the execution of applications. At the permission level , it 
can allow or reject permission requests of certain applications. 
The allowed flag can either be true or false and determines, if the rule is a granting 
or a denying rule: a granting rule permits a execution or permission request while a 
denying rule forbids the request. Depending on what applications and permissions 
are defined in a rule , the allowed flag can be automatically applied at either the 
application or the permission level. Therefore, only one allowed flag is needed for 
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both levels of control. To clarify this, Table 3.2 below shows all possible combinations 
of permissions and applications in a given rule (P = Permission set, A = Application 
set). The shareable flag will be discussed in Section 3.3 since it is used to provide 
dynamic role based access control. 
0P A 0A 
0PA~A 
~P A 0A 
~P A~A 
A rule without permissions or applications does not define anything and 
is therefore superfluous 
The allowed flag is applied at the application level to allow j deny the 
execution of application(s) in A 
The allowed flag is applied at the permission level to allow/ deny per-
mission(s) in P for any applications on the device 
The allowed flag is applied at the permission level to allow / deny the 
permission(s) in P for application(s) in A 
Table 3.2: Permission and application combinations in a rule 
When combined with the existing Android permission model, DR BACA can define 
the currently available permission set of each application for every user through this 
static RBAC as shown in the following equation. Pi defines the permission set granted 
during installation time for application ai , p~eny is the permission set specified in all 
relevant denying rules. A relevant rule is any rule that is associated with the current 
user (via his / her roles) , and applicable to the application ai. p iallow is the permission 
set specified in all relevant granting rules . 
(3.1) 
Any permission request that is both part of the original permission set Pi and the 
related granting rules Ptllow will be accepted. It is important to note that granting 
rules supersede denying rules if two rules are in conflict with each other. T he same 
concept can be applied at the application level. If there is any relevant granting rule, 
or if there is no relevant denying rule, the application is allowed to execute. 
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3.3 Dynamic Role Based Access Control 
One drawback with a static RBAC system is that in a production environment , 
users sometime need to promote or demote their privileges t emporarily depending on 
certain circumstances (i.e. emergencies). A static role-based access control system is 
not ideal to handle such situations. Leveraging the unique ability of mobile devices to 
take environmental conditions into account, DR BACA provides dynamic role based 
access control through context-awareness via shareable rules. 
A context itself can consist of different environmental components such as the 
current location of the device, the current day and time or even an event such as 
receiving an Android intent. At any given moment , a context can either be fulfilled 
or not. For a given context-aware rule , if the context is currently fulfilled , we call 
it an explicit rule. If the context is currently not fulfilled , we call it an implicit 
rule. Based on the current context, an application execution or permission request 
can be dynamically allowed or denied, either explicitly or implicitly as shown in 
Table 3.3 (c is the context fulfilled flag). For example, suppose a rule defines that 
gaming applications are not allowed during working hours (e.g. 9am to 5pm). If 
the current time is lOam, then this rule explicitly denies the execution of gaming 
application. However , if the current time is lam, this rule implicitly allows the 
execution of gaming applications. If two rules conflict with each other , the explicit · 
rule supersedes any implicit rule. The justification for this approach is as follows: an 
explicit rule is specifically created by a creator of a security policy. This creator will 
expect that rule to be followed in any circumstance. If an implicit rule could supersede 
that explicit rule, the creators expectations would not be met, causing confusion and 
possibly introduce security issues. If two conflicting rules are both explicit or both 
implicit , then the granting rule supersedes the denying rule. This approach allows 
for situations where the users of a given role are generally restricted from performing 
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a certain action but a small subset of these users still need to be allowed to perform 
that same action. By superseding granting rules over denying rules, we can achieve 
this situation by intentionally creating two conflicting rules: the denying rule will be 
applied to all users while the allowing rule will only be applied to the small subset of 
these users. 
c && allowed explicitly allow 
c && -.,allowed explicitly deny 
--.,c && -.,allowed implicitly allow 
--.,c && allowed implicitly deny 
Table 3.3: Explicit or implicit rules 
A rule can be temporarily shared with other users on another device. The shareable 
flag of any given rule defines if the rule can be shared or not . This can be very useful 
for users to temporarily promote or demote their privileges depending on the current 
circumstances. For example, a doctor may temporarily grant his assisting nurse a rule 
that allows the execution of a certain application which is normally only executable 
by doctors. Another example would be to temporarily grant camera execution rights 
to the check-in staff in order to register a new patient . Either way, a temporary role 
will be created for the receiving user which will contain this shared rule. DR BACA 
provides the sharing of rules through the use of Near Field Communication (NFC), 
which will be described in detail in the next section. 
Table 3.4 gives a few examples of how DR BACA rules can be defined in practice. 
Note that applications can be grouped as well. Instead of having to individually add 
all applications that fall under a certain rule , one can simply group these applications 
and only add the group to the desired rule. It is also important to note here that while 
a rule can grant a certain permission to an application, the application itself must 
still request that permission during installation. Otherwise, Android's own reference 
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monitor will reject the permission request before DR BACA is even involved in the 
decision process. 
(BROWSK.NOK, F , F, {INET}, {BROWSER}, Reject INTERNET permission for the BROWSER ap-
{WORKHOUR} ) plication during working hours 
(INET _NOK , F , F , {INET} , {} , {WORKDAYS}) Reject INTERNET permission for any application 
during work days (MON-FRI) 
(INET_OK, T , T , {!NET} , {COMPANYAPPS} , {}) Allow INTERNET permission for all COMPA-
NYAPPS. This rule can also be transferred using NFC 
(NO_GAMES, F , F, {}, {GAMES} , {WORKHOUR}) All game applications cannot be executed during work-
ing hours 
Table 3.4: Example DR BACA rules 
By applying the RBAC model to Android systems and taking advantage of Android 's 
unique ability of environmental awareness , the DR BACA model we introduced here 
enhances the current Android permission model by providing a finer-grained access 
control for mobile devices . The next section will focus on how we applied t his model 
in our DR BACA system implementation. 
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Chapter 4 
DR BACA System 
In this section , we describe the architecture and design of our DR BACA system and 
its components. In particular, we discuss how sharable rules can be implemented 
through NFC technology. We show how DR BACA can provide enhanced security 
while providing scalability for large corporat e environments. Furthermore, we discuss 
how DR BACA itself has been secured to avoid malicious users from t ampering with 
it. 
4.1 Architecture 
Figure 4·1 illustrat es DR BACA's architecture on a high level. The application layer 
consists of third-party applications that are inst alled on the mobile device. As shown 
in the legend , the full arrows show the execution flow when a permission or execution 
request occurs. The dotted lines indicat e how information flows inside the system. 
The following subsections focus on different components and explain t hem in more 
detail. 
4.1.1 User Manager 
DR BACA offers multi-user management capabilities through the User Manager com-
ponent , which allows different users t o log into the same mobile device. Users will 
have different permissions , based on DR BACA's S ecurity P olicy. DR BACA assures , 
that no security sensitive information remains running between different user logins. 
24 
• • • 8 
Application layer 
, 
, 
, 
Admin 
~ , 
r--j~;~~~-tEx;.~~~==============~ ,'r---~------~ 
DR BACA Service 
Android Middleware 
( DR BACA Ul ) 
•• ~ 
I 
- Polley Provider 
Configuration 
Server 
_.- - - Information flow 
~ Execution flow 
Figure 4·1: DR BACA architecture 
For example, if a permission request was granted for an application, the permission 
will be revoked once that user logs out. This is necessary because the user who logs 
in next might not be granted the same permission. 
On the other hand, DR BACA also allows a single user to log into different 
devices that fall under the same security policy. This works because the security 
policy contains all necessary information to authenticate any user that belongs to the 
same security domain (i.e. a company). 
Allowing users to log into different devices can especially be beneficial for env1-
ronments with many mobile devices, because a device does not necessarily have to be 
allocated to a specific employee thereby simplifying administration and dist ribution 
of mobile devices. 
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4.1.2 Permission/Execution Checker 
This is the core component of the DR BACA system which decides if a permission 
or execution request should be permitted or rejected. The major difference between 
an execution request and a permission request is that the permission request first 
consults the Android reference monitor, whereas an execution request immediately 
invokes DR BACA's Permission 8 Execution Checker. In case of a permission request , 
if Android rejects the request , DR BACA is not consulted and the permission request 
is immediately rejected. If the request is permitted by Android's reference monitor, 
DR BACA is invoked and follows the steps shown in Figure 4·2. 
Request accepted Request denied 
Figure 4·2: Permission & execution request flowchart 
DR BACA first checks if a user is currently logged in. It is important to note that 
~ 
locking the device will not cause the current user to log out . The only time a user 
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is logged out is when another user logs in. Because of this, the only time a DR 
BACA-enabled device will not find a current ly logged in user is between device 
st artup and the first user login. During that time frame, all permission and exe-
cution requests will be granted by default. This makes sense because the majority 
of these applications are essential for the mobile device t o work properly. This ap-
proach leaves one possible security issue: a malicious application that contains t he 
RECEIVE_BOOT _COMPLETED permission can start once the Android system is 
booted and before a user logs in . While the current version of DR BACA does not 
consider this particular security issue, a future version might t ackle t he problem by 
means of white-listing applications that are allowed t o auto start . 
If a user is currently logged in, DR BACA will retrieve all applicable rules for 
the given user based by consult ing all of t he current users roles. An applicable rule 
is any rule that involves the requested application and permission and is owned by 
the current user based on his/ her role(s). If no such rule is found , the request is by 
default permitted . Some might argue, that a deny-per-default mechanism would be 
more secure. However , this would not only increase t he configuration effort of DR 
BACA but would also very likely lead to a lot of false negatives where legit imate 
requests would be rejected , in t he worst case crippling the function ality of the mobile 
device. If at least one applicable rule is found , DR BACA will grant t he request if 
and only if one of the rules explicit ly or implicitly allows the request . As an example, 
the rule in Listing 1 explicitly allows the INTERNET permission for t he browser 
application . 
{ 
} 
"permissions" : [ "INTERNET" ], 
"apps" : [ "BROWSER" ], 
"rulename" : "INET_ALLOWED" , 
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Listing 1: Allow INTERNET for Browser #1 
The rule shown in Listing 2 implicitly allows the INTERNET perm1ss10n for the 
browser application outside of office hours. Assuming that WORKHOUR is defined 
as 9am to 5pm, this rule will implicitly allow the INTERNET permission for the 
browser application from 5pm to 8.59am. 
As mentioned in the DR BACA model section, an explicitly granted rule super-
sedes an implicitly granted rule. 
{ 
} 
"permissions" : [ "INTERNET"], 
"apps" : [ "BROWSER" ], 
"rulename" : "INET_DENIED" , 
"contexts" : [ "WORKHOUR" ], 
"allowed" : false 
Listing 2: Allow INTERNET for Browser #2 
4.1.3 Context Monitor 
If a rule is associated with some context , the Context Monitor will be consulted to 
check if the context is currently fulfilled or not. At this point , the Context Monitor 
can check the current location, time and day. Additional contexts have been con-
sidered and will be added in a next release of DR BACA. For example, t o further 
mitigate permission re-delegation attacks , the chain of applications requesting a given 
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permission could be implemented as an additional context. 
As discussed in Section 3.3, each context-aware rule can either explicitly or im-
plicitly grant or reject a request. By using context-aware security rules, the Context 
Monitor component enables DR BACA to provide dynamic role-based access control 
(RBAC) for Android devices. 
4.1.4 Rule sharing Agent 
Through use of Near Field Communication (NFC) technology, DR BACA supports 
sharable rules between users to provide additional dynamic RBAC capability. Users 
can temporarily elevate or demote their privileges through NFC tags. Android sup-
ports NFC since version 2.3 (Gingerbread). NFC allows for radio communication be-
tween NFC enabled devices. NFC builds on top of the older RFID (Radio-frequency 
identification) technology that is still in widespread use today (tracking tags , access 
control applications , anti-theft, e-passports, etc). NFC allows for two-way communi-
cation which, for example, allows two mobile devices to exchange information simply 
through holding the devices close to each other. NFC tags are equipped with a radio 
chip for communication. They can store small amounts of data, normally around one 
to four kilobytes. Once an NFC-enabled device gets within the proximity of an NFC 
tag , the tag draws power from the device through magnetic induction. This allows 
the tag to start communicating with the device . NFC tags can be rewritten sev-
eral thousand times or they can be configured to be read-only. DR BACA currently 
utilizes NFC in two ways: sharing rules through Device--+Device and Tag--+Device. 
Device-+ Device: In this scenario , a set of rules can be shared temporarily between 
NFC-enabled DR BACA devices. The user initiating the process can select a subset 
of the sharable rules he/she currently owns and initiate the sharing process by moving 
his/her mobile device close to the receiving mobile device. As shown previously, each 
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rule contains a flag (shareable) which eit her allows or disallows the rule to b e shared. 
This gives the security policy t eam more control over what kind of rules users are 
able t o share wit h each other. The data t ransferred between the two devices contains 
the following: 
• Rule name(s) contains the name of the rule(s) that should t emporarily be 
shared . 
• Duration indicat es in minutes how long the rule(s) are to be shared . 
Since we do not protect the dat a t ransferred between two mobile devices , we need to 
assure that t his transfer cannot be forged by a malicious user. This can be achieved 
by only allowing this form of communication between two inst ances (one on each 
device) of the Rule sharing Agent. In DR BACA, this application is a syst em ap-
plication which cannot be removed or overwritten by an unprivileged user. Every 
application running on Android has to be digitally signed with a cert ificat e of which 
the application developer owns the private key. This requirement is furt her explained 
at (C oogle, 2013c). The rule sharing agent on the receiving device will first verify 
t he other agent 's certificat e before adding the temporarily shared rules to the cur-
rent user. If t he certificat e verification fails, no rules will be shared. This prevents a 
maliciously created agent from forging and sharing rules with other agents. 
Tag---+ Device: Similar to the Device-+ Device mechanism , one can use the Tag---+ Device 
mechanism to temporarily share rule(s) via NFC. This works by moving the mobile 
device close to a NFC t ag which will t hen initiate the communication . In addition 
to the information (rule names and duration time) sent during a Device---+Device 
transaction , the following information is additionally transferred : 
• TagiD is a unique ID consisting of 8 hexadecimal digits (i .e. 1280CDB6) which 
is imprinted into the hardware by the tag manufacturer ; 
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• Role name(s) contains the role(s) that are allowed to make use of the rule(s) 
stored on this tag; and 
• Digital signature, which protects the integrity of the TagiD , rule name(s) and 
duration. 
Before the rule is granted , DR BACA verifies the following: 
1. Verify that the currently logged in user is associated with at least one of the 
roles defined on the tag. This is necessary, because sometimes a certain rule 
should only be granted to a certain group of users. As an example: a doctor may 
be allowed to temporarily receive a rule that allows receiving a given medical 
record. However , a different doctor who scans the same tag should not be 
granted the same privileges . 
2. Verify the digital signature which covers all data on the tag. Using a digital 
signature provides integrity protection and prevents tags from being maliciously 
forged. If any of the information on the tag is modified after the fact, the digital 
signature verification will fail and the rule(s) will not be granted. Furthermore, 
if a malicious user tries to simply copy the entire information onto a new tag, 
the signature on the new t ag would not pass verification because the TagiD 
is different . Only the owner of the private key (i.e. the IT department of a 
company) used to create the digital signature will be able to create NFC tags 
that are accepted by DR BACA. 
4.1.5 Scalability Through Configuration Server 
DR BACA comes with its own stand-alone Configuration Server offering a simple-
to-use user interface through which an administrator (or a privileged end-user) can 
create and alter a security policy. The policy is stored in a database on the server 
and can be retrieved by any DR BACA-enabled mobile devices through the Policy 
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Provider on the server. DR BACA-enabled mobile devices can either periodically 
check for an updated security policy or manually initiate an update request . Under 
normal circumstances, the security policy of an organization will not change very 
frequently. It is therefore unlikely that mobile devices will constantly have to pull 
an updated security policy from the server. The policy provider returns the entire 
security policy in the form of a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) (JSON-Group, 
2012) object. JSON is considered to be a light-weight alternative to the Extensible 
Markup Language (XML) (W3C, 2013). Since JSON provides all the functionality 
required by DR BACA, it was chosen over XML. A JSON object consists of key-
value pairs. The values can be other JSON objects, JSON arrays or primitive data 
types such as strings or integers. The next section will explain how this JSON data 
is protected from eavesdropping. This configuration server turns DR BACA into a 
very scalable solution, easing management efforts when dozens or hundreds of mobile 
devices are involved. 
While the Configuration Server is a very convenient way of creating a security 
policy, it is an optional component of DR BACA. For this reason, a security policy 
can be created or modified directly on the mobile device. In an environment with a 
configuration server, this option can be disabled to prevent users from modifying the 
security policy. 
An additional scalability concern is how DR BACA can be installed on mobile 
devices. The DR BACA installation process (including rooting -and unrooting the 
device) can for the most part be automated through installation scripts, resulting 
in an acceptable amount of installation time per device. In our tests , a DR BACA 
installation on a new mobile device took under five minutes with minimal manual 
configuration. Once DR BACA is installed , it can be fully controlled through the 
security policy. 
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4. 2 Context Management 
This section discusses in detail, how different contexts are managed and checked. 
Currently, DR BACA takes three contexts into account: time, day and location. 
4.2.1 Time context 
A time context consists of the tuple (begin , end) . In order to check for the fulfillment 
of this context, DR BACA requires the current time. Android allows users to eit her 
automatically set the current date and time based on the mobile devices location 
or let t he user set the t ime and date manually. As explained in the next chapter in 
Section 5.4, the DR BACA System Application allows administrators to prevent users 
from manually setting the mobile device 's date and time. The checking mechanism 
of the time context is very simple as shown in the following pseudo-code: 
Data: begin , end, currenLtime 
Result : Context fulfilled or not fulfilled 
if begin<= currenLtime < end then 
I return true; 
else 
I return false; 
end 
Algorithm 1: Time context fulfillment check 
4.2.2 Day context 
A day context consists of a fixed-length boolean array with 7 elements . This array 
indicates on which days the context is fulfilled. For example, the array (f,f,t ,t ,t ,f,f) 
where f =false and t =true indicates , that this context is fulfilled on the t hird , fourth 
and fifth day of the week. We defined the value at index 0 to stand for Monday, at 
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index 1 for Tuesday, up until index 6 which stands for Sunday. Following this con-
vention, the here provided day context example is fulfilled on Wednesday, Thursday 
and Friday. Again, Section 5.4 explains how the DR BACA System Application can 
prevent users from manually setting the mobile device's date and time. Checking if 
the day context is fulfilled can be achieved with the following (trivial) pseudo-code: 
Data: day Array, current_day 
Result: Context fulfilled or not fulfilled 
return dayArray[currenLday]; 
Algorithm 2: Day context fulfillment check 
4.2.3 Location context 
A location is defined as the tuple (longitude, latitude, radius). In order to check this 
context for its fulfillment, we require the current longitude and latitude of the mobile 
device , which can be retrieved through the API provided by Android. 
A location context is fulfilled , if the current location is within the area defined by 
the location tuple. A simple way of checking this would be by calculating the distance 
between the point (longitude,latitude) and the current location. If the distance is 
larger than the given radius, the current location is not within this specific location 
context. Otherwise, the context is fulfilled. 
Unfortunately, the above idea is imprecise for large areas because of the earths 
curvature. Luckily, the haversine formula provides just what we need: a way of 
finding the distance between two points on a sphere when given their longitudes and 
latitudes. An explanation of the haversine formula can be found at (Veness, 2012). 
Let R be the earth's radius in kilometers, <p the latitude, .A the longitude and d 
the distance between two points in kilometers. A point is uniquely identified by its 
longitude and latitude. a and c are helper variables. The distance between two points 
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can be calculat ed as follows: 
R = 6371 
!:::. c.p !:::..A 
a = sin2( 2 ) + cos( c.p1) *cos( c.p2) * sin2( 2 ) 
c = 2 * atan2( JO,, ~) 
( 4.1) 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
If dis now smaller t han t he radius provided by t he context (in kilomet ers), t he current 
location is within t he area of this contexts location . The following pseudo-code checks 
if a given location contexts is fulfilled : 
Data: c.p1 , .A 1 , radius 
Result: Context fulfilled or not fulfilled 
dist = calculateDist ance( c.p 1 , .AI); 
if dist <= radius then 
I return true; 
else 
I return false; 
end 
Algorithm 3: Location context fulfillment check 
4.3 Security 
4.3.1 Encrypted policy retrieval 
When an Android device request s t he security policy from the configuration server, 
that information is t ransferred over pot entially insecure networks. The security policy 
itself contains some sensit ive information such as user names , hashed passwords, roles 
and rules. In order to protect t his information , DR BACA symmetrically encrypts 
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the transferred information using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (with 
a 256 bit long secret key) (Daemen and Rijmen , 1998). The hashed value of the 
current user's password is used as this secret key. This approach has one important 
shortcoming: the entropy of the chosen secret key (the password 's hash value) depends 
on the current user 's password . In information theory, the entropy as introduced by 
(Shannon, 1948) measures the uncertainty of a random variable. The higher the 
entropy, the less predictable the value is. Now, in order to generate a high 'entropy 
256 bit secret key, the user 's password needs to have a length of about 48 to 64 
characters , depending on the actual randomness of the password . NIST's (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology) Electronic Authentication Guideline (Burr 
et al., 2011) contains more information on how to calculate the ent ropy ofrandom and 
user-chosen passwords. Since it is unfeasible for users to enter such a long password 
(more appropriately called a passphrase) during every log in, especially on a mobile 
device, an attacker might be able to decrypt DR BACA's security policy while it is 
being transferred over an insecure network. However , the advantage of using this 
approach is, t hat no secret key needs to be stored on the mobile devices. Since t he 
security policy does not contain highly sensitive data such as credit card information 
or cleartext passwords , we decided that the here discussed approach provides a high 
enough level of confidentiality. If a future version of DR BACA transmits more 
sensitive information , this approach needs to be reevaluated. 
4.3.2 NFC tag integrity protection 
As previously discussed, the NFC tags are data integrity protected using public key 
encryption. The private key is known to t he DR BACA administrators only (i.e. the 
IT department of a company) and is only required during the creation of the NFC 
tags. The public key is stored on the system partition of the mobile device (as part 
of t he DR BACA Application). Android restricts access to t hat partition and only 
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allows system applications to read or write from it. In order to prevent having to 
recompile the DR BACA application for each new organization, the stored public key 
can be overwritten during the DR BACA installation process. This is possible because 
during the installation , the mobile device is unlocked , allowing administrators read 
and write access to the system partition. Once DR BACA is installed , the device is 
locked again to prevent any further system modification. 
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Chapter 5 
DR BACA Implementation 
This chapter offers a more detailed view of the actual implementation of our DR 
BACA system. In order to do so, we discuss the location of our code relative to 
the Android framework as well as what Android components needed to be modified 
for DR BACA to work. During this research , effort was spent in discovering how 
the Android operating system works and, especially, how it makes security-related 
decisions. There are unfortunately not a lot of good online resources that explain the 
Android framework in detail. For this reason , the additional benefit of this chapter 
is to provide interested readers with a starting point for their own research related to 
the Android operating system. 
In the coming sections, Android components which we modified to incorporate 
the DR BACA system are identified by a striped red/green background. Components 
used exclusively by DR BACA are shown with a green background. The sections are 
loosely based on the DR BACA architecture Figure 4·1 from the previous chapter. 
However, that figure offered a high-level overview of the general architect ure and 
some of the components mentioned here are not shown in that figure. For the exact 
locations of the herein mentioned files , the reader is referred to Appendix A. DR 
BACA's entire source code is available in the research repository at: 
http:/ /met-mobile. bu. edujsvnjrepoj jelix/drbaca 
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PackageManagerServlce.java 
ActlvltyManagerServlce.java 
Applicatlon.java 
PolicyEnforcer.java 
DateTimeSettlngs.java 
Process.java 
Figure 5·1 : Permission & Execution Checker files 
5.1 Permission & Execution Checker 
PackageManagerService.java contains a hook in its checkPermission method. We 
added the hook after Android 's own reference monitor. This way, DR BACA only 
gets involved, if the Android would allow the permission request. If Android rejects 
a request, no further overhead is introduced by our solut ion. 
ActivityManagerService.java contains a hook in its checkComponentPermission 
method which is similar to t he checkPermission method in the P ackageManagerSer-
vice class. The difference is , that the checkComponentPermission method is invoked 
when intents (with their own permissions) are sent between different applications. 
The PackageManagerService class does not handle t hese events. 
Application.java contains a hook in t he onCreate method which will be executed 
whenever an application starts. The DR BACA system will decide, if the application 
in question is indeed allowed to start or not. If not , DR BACA will show an error 
message to the user and terminate the application. 
PolicyEnforcer.java serves as a proxy in front of the DRBacaService and handles 
the initialization and error handling of the DRBacaService. This addit ional layer also 
separates t he caller from the actual policy-enforcement implementation. 
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DateTimeSettings.java prevents or allows to manual change of the mobile device's 
current time and date. Some users might try to change the device's current date 
or time in order to circumvent certain context-sensitive rules. Depending on DR 
BACA's configuration , this manual change of time and date can be restricted . 
Process.java is a low-level Android class responsible for handling the creation of 
processes. Most Android applications run in a separate process. Similar to the Ap-
plication class above, the Process class is called when a new application requests to 
be started. The reason we had to modify this class is worth noting. While most 
permission requests are requested by calling the checkPermission method mentioned 
previously, the following Android permissions (among other Android internal p ermis-
sions) are an exception: 
• android .permission.INTERNET; 
• android. permission . CAMERA; 
• android.permission .WRITE_EXTERNALSTORAGE; and 
• android.permission.BLUETOOTH. 
The complete list of all permissions that do not call t he checkPermission method are 
stored in an XML file on the Android mobile device in the location: 
jsystemjetcjpermissionsj platform.xml 
Instead of calling the checkPermission method of the PackageManagerService class, 
the above permissions are assigned to Android applications through different group-
id 's. Whenever an application is requesting one or more of the above p ermissions , the 
Process class will add the corresponding group-id to the process that will hold the 
newly started application. Before a group-id is granted to a new process , DR BACA 
will first check if the application in question is indeed allowed to use any of the above 
mentioned permissions. If this is not the case, the group-id will not be added to the 
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process, effectively preventing the application inside that process from utilizing that 
permission. 
5. 2 Context & User Manager 
DRBacaService.java 
DRBacaManager 
RuleVerifier.java 
LocationHolder.java 
Figure 5·2: Context & User Manager components 
DRBacaService.java is a system service that handles user access control based on 
the provided security policy. This service will often communicate with the DRBACA 
application mentioned in the previous section to make access control decisions. 
DRBacaManager is responsible for creating all objects required to make proper 
access decisions such as users , roles , rules and contexts. These objects are held in 
memory rather than on persistent storage (i.e . files or databases) to improve perfor-
mance. Whenever the mobile device is restarted , these objects are again initialized 
and made available. 
This component is a standard Java application without any coupling to the An-
droid framework. This allowed us to easily perform extensive unit tests to assure the 
correctness of the application. The unit tests were performed with the latest J ava 
testing framework JUnit (Junit-Team , 2013). At the time of this writing, the latest 
JUnit testing framework is version 4. 
RuleVerifier.java is used to periodically determine if previously granted permission 
or execution requests are still valid. When DRBacaService is initialized , it initializes 
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a RuleVerifier object that runs in a separate thread and periodically checks all pre-
viously granted requests. If this thread finds that one of the requests is no longer 
fulfilled , it will notify the DRBacaService which in turn will inform the user of this 
situation. Figure 5·3 shows the message the user will receive. At this point, the user 
has two options: immediately terminate the application which contains a request t hat 
is no longer permitted or terminate the application automatically after five minutes. 
We chose a duration of five minutes, because it should provide a user with enough 
time to finish up important work. At the same time, this time extension should not 
cause severe security issues. Currently, this extension time is fixed. In order to pro-
vide more flexible configuration , a future version of DR BACA could retrieve this 
duration from the security policy. 
LocationHolder .java is responsible for t he periodic update of the current location. 
The DR BACA security policy contains a setting which defines the period in which 
a location update should be requested. The default setting is set to five minutes. 
Chapter 7 will show, that a location update interval of five minutes is a good tradeoff 
between performance and battery life. 
RBACA Close 
Termination requested 
App: com.android.browser 
user. NINA 
Reason Rulo no longor fulfilled 
Info: Auto shutdown m 18 seconds 
Options: 
Close app now 
Close app in 5 min 
Figure 5·3: Request no longer fulfilled 
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5.3 Other DR BACA Service Components 
DRBacaLog.java 
PerformanceTest.java 
pollcy.json 
Figure 5·4: Other DR BACA service files 
DRBacaLog.java is a wrapper around Android 's own logging mechanism which is 
called LogCat . This wrapper is used instead of the actual LogCat implementation in 
order to give us more flexibility when debugging the application. 
PerformanceTest.java contains functionality to run part of the performance eval-
uation of our system. See Chapter 7 for the evaluation results . 
policy.json is the file that contains the actual security policy. As the file extension 
suggest s, it is stored as a JSON object . Appendix B contains a complet e security 
policy, which was used during the evaluation of DR BACA. 
5.4 DR BACA System Application 
DRBaca Application 
DRBaca.aidl 
Figure 5·5: DR BACA system application components 
DRBaca Application offers an interface between the user /administrator and the 
DR BACA service running on the framework layer. This is the only essential appli-
cat ion required on a DR BACA-enabled mobile device. It is t herefore registered as a 
system application and cannot be modified or deleted by a non-privileged user. The 
application includes the following functionality: 
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1. Create, modify or delete the currently used DR BACA security policy. In 
an environment where this policy is retrieved from the external configuration 
server , access to this functionality can be restricted to prevent unauthorized 
users from modifying the security policy directly on the mobile device. 
2. Collect location data (longitude and latitude) which can then be incorporated 
into a DR BACA security policy. 
3. Check digit ally signed NFC tags. The DRBaca application stores the public 
key that corresponds to the private key with which the digitally signed NFC 
tags were created. Therefore, this application is responsible for verifying the 
correctness of an NFC tag digital signature. 
4. Configure miscellaneous settings. There are currently three settings that can 
be configured: 
(a) Set the location of the Configuration Server. 
(b) Allow or disallow local date and time changes. Disallowing these changes 
prevents users from circumventing date or time sensitive rules. The Figures 
in 5·6 show the effect this setting has on the Android 's Setting application. 
In Figure 5·6a, a user can simply switch off " Automatic date & time" 
and" Automatic time zone" and set a new current time while Figure 5·6b 
prevents the user from doing so. 
(c) Define the time interval at which a new location update should be re-
quested. Location update requests over GPS is an expensive operation 
which can consume a lot of battery life. For this reason , DR BACA allows 
this value to be changed and stored as part of the security policy. 
DRBaca.aidl is the interface which the DRBacaService implements. Same as normal 
Java interfaces, an AIDL (Android Interface Definit ion Language) interface provides 
the method signatures of the implementing class. Since our DRBaca application 
(a) Date and t ime change 
allowed 
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(b) Date and time change 
not allowed 
Figure 5·6: Date and time settings 
needs to be able to communicate with the framework-level DRBacaService, it needs 
to know the methods the service offers . 
5.5 DR BACA Registration 
In order for DR BACA to work, Android needs to know of its existence. This can be 
achieved by modifying the files mentioned in this section. 
SystemServer.java 
core.mk 
Android.mk 
Figure 5· 7: DR BACA registration files 
SystemServer .java is responsible for initializing all other system services. A system 
service is a component, that runs at all t imes and with system permissions. Since 
the DR BACA system relies on exactly such a service, we modified t he SystemServer 
class to include our own service which will then be started at boot t ime. 
core.mk is one of the makefiles that is called when the Android system is built. We 
need to add our system application (DRBACA Application) to this makefile in order 
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for it to be included in t he build. 
Android.mk contains all system services to be included. We therefore needed to 
add our own system service (DRBacaService). 
5.6 User Authentication 
PasswordUnlockScreen.java 
security _settlngs_plcker.xml 
keyguard_screen_password_landscape.xml 
keyguard_screen_password_portrait.xml 
Figure 5·8: User authentication files 
PasswordUnlockScreen.java is the class that implements the login screen. We 
modified it to allow multi-user authenticated logins. Once t he user enters a username 
and password, t his class will ask the DRBacaService to verify the credentials. 
security _settings_picker .xml defines what lock screens are available to the de-
VIce user. In order to prevent a user from simply changing our modified user-
name/password lock screen with for example a facial recognition lock, we commented 
out all the possible lock screens with the exception of our own. A user who wanted 
to circumvent this would have to undo our modification and recompile the Android 
system. 
keyguard_screen_password_landscape.xml is the resource file that defines the 
landscape layout of the login screen. We modified it to allow multi-user authenticated 
logins. 
keyguard_screen_password_portrait.xml is the resource file that defines the por-
trait layout of the login screen. We modified it to allow multi-user authenticated 
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logins. 
5. 7 Helper Applications 
While t he heart of the DR BACA system consist s of the components discussed in the 
previous sections, we developed t he additional Android applications shown in Figure 
5·9. 
(a) PTest (b) DigiSign 
Figure 5·9: Helper applications 
5. 7.1 PTest (Figure 5·9a) 
This application provides two functions used during the performance evaluation of 
DR BACA: 
1. Simulate user behavior over a specifiable period of time. The simulation 
starts and continues applications a given time. The tester can choose which 
applications to start and when they should be started. Once the simulation is 
running , it will periodically save the battery status to persistent storage. This 
application allowed us to evaluate the different performance tests discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
2. Capture permission and execution request overhead and compare that 
overhead to Android 's own access control mechanisms. Again , this was used to 
evaluate DR BACA's performance as discussed in Chapter 7. 
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5.7.2 DigiSign (Figure 5·9b) 
This application allows the creation of digitally signed NFC tags which can then 
be used by DR BACA. Since this application is loaded with a private key in order 
to create digitally signed NFC tags, it is essential that access to this application 
is restricted to authorized personnel only, such as system administrators or t he IT 
department. 
5.8 Configuration Server 
The Configuration Server is an optional component of DR BACA and mainly consists 
of a front-end user interface written in HTML, PHP and JavaScript and a back-end 
MySQL database to store all relevant information. The Configuration Server used 
during development of DR BACA is located at: 
http:/ /me t-mobile. bu. edu/ drbaca 
The user interface provides a simple way to create users, roles, rules and contexts, 
which are combined into a single security policy. Figure 5·10 shows a snapshot of the 
Configuration Server. 
-Uo1 .... 
--
--
Useruame Fln;tna mc 
I'I!I.Jll 
-
GUY fint 
ZOMS 
-
JSON Deayptad 
r • tatus•:"'SUCCESS", "usa"": 
DR BACA Configuration SeiVer 
Lastname 
-
Jut 
-
Roles 
ROLE I 
ROL£1 
ROLE I 
Password 
oefa.ll20c7d001oe!Milt9cl24nd2DOOrcW65245dab!M6 
Jn!HJ2078f4:W92n 90 
15M! 1 FWN1 "1WN1Ht0dlaii35'7412W 
.... ..........,351 
1 { "usemame":"FEUX'". "firstname ":"felb:". "lostnD.me":"rohriJ.I"' , "pw" :"e2S&beefla 160270flb088ea. 7f8827ac:920bo4bcl Oad96b 7&3od 17ddo2ce39". 
"nHes":("ROl.El "J} . 
{"usamame":"GUY","firsmama":"ftnt","lastnama":"las t","pw":"aoflll f20c7d001ae96119a2472d2400llb65245dab9e63779b2078f43492729Cr,"rokts 
":("ROl.El "l} , 
Figure 5·10: DR BACA Configuration Server 
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DR BACA-enabled devices retrieve t he security policy by accessing the following 
URL: 
http:/ / m et-mobile. bu. edu/ drbacajb / listener. php 
T his URL provides the encrypted security policy to any connecting client . The en-
crypted security policy is provided in binary form. To prevent an accidental corrup-
t ion of this binary data, for example by different character encoding mechanisms, DR 
BACA uses t he Base64 ( Josefsson, 2006) encoding scheme, which provides binary-to-
text conversions. 
The design for the back-end database is shown m the Entity Relationship (ER) 
diagram in Figure 5·11. 
users perms apps 
usemame permna m e packa gename flrstname appname lastname 
password 
1 1 1 
"' "' "' 
userrole roles perm rule apprule 
usemame 
"' 
1 rolename permn ame package name 
role name rul enam e rule na me 
1 "' "' 
"' 
1 
rolerule rules 
role name 
"' 
1 rulename 1 
rulename isAIIowed 
isShareab le 
1 
days 
"' day na me daycontext contextrule mon 
tue 1 
"' 
contextna me 
"' rul ena me wed dayname r--- contextname 
thu 
frl 
sat 
sun 
"' 
locations locatio neon text 
location name 1 
"' 
contextname 
"' 1 radius locat lonname r-- 1 
longitude ._____ contexts 
latitude 
co ntextna me 
times timecontext 1 
tim e name 1 
"' 
contextna me 
tbegin tlmename 
"' 
1 
tend 
Figure 5· 11 : Configuration Server database ER 
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The bold names indicate primary keys. Two bold names within the same entity 
indicates a composite primary key. Since relationships such as users to roles are 
many-to-many relationships , a conjunction table (e.g. userrole) is added in order to 
turn a many-to-many relationship into two one-to-many relationships. This database 
is in the 3NF (Normal Form) and redundancy is reduced to a minimum. 
Chapter 6 
Scenarios 
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In this section, we provide two scenarios that explain , how requests are handled by DR 
BACA. The scenarios were used with a Samsung Nexus S (device A) and a Samsung 
Galaxy Nexus (device B). Both devices were running ICS 4.0 .4 and included the DR 
BACA system. 
6.1 Restricting Non-malicious Applications 
This first scenario shows how DR BACA behaves in a non-malicious environment. It 
further shows, how a rule can temporarily be shared between devices. The scenario 
takes place in a financial institution. All employees were issued Android devices run-
ning DR BACA. However, the IT department is worried about sensitive information 
being leaked through the use of smartphone cameras. Therefore, DR BACA is used 
to prohibit the usage the camera feature during office hours. The employees of the IT 
department form an exception to this rule and are allowed to use the camera appli-
cation. Based on this description, the IT department created the two rules shown in 
Listing 3, added them to the security policy, and updated all involved mobile devices. 
The first rule prevents any employee from starting the camera application during 
work hour·s and wor-k days. The second rule eliminates the restrictions of the general 
rule by explicitly allowing access to the camera for employees in the IT department. 
In order to test this scenario, we logged into device A as a normal employee and as 
an IT employee into device B. 
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{ 
"rules" : [ 
{ 
"apps" : [ "CAMERA" ] , 
"roles" : [ II EMPLOYEE II J ' 
"rulename" : "CAMERA_DENIED" , 
"allowed" : false , 
"shareable" : false , 
"contexts" : [ II WORKHOUR II ' 
"WORKDAY" ] 
}, 
{ 
"apps" : [ "CAMERA" ] , 
"roles" : [ "IT" ] , 
"rulename" : "CAMERA_ALLOWED" , 
"allowed" : true , 
"shareable" : true , 
"contexts" : [] 
} 
J 
} 
Listing 3: Partial financial institution policy 
If the employee with device A tries to start the camera application, the error message 
in Figure 6·1 will be shown. The window provides information to the user , explaining 
why the request failed. The only two options the user has at this point is either to 
accept the rejection or switch to another user account that may have the privilege to 
start the camera application. 
Now, let's assume the IT employee with device B would like to temporarily grant 
the camera-execution permission to the employee with device A. In order to do so, 
the user of device B can start the Rule Sharing Agent, select the appropriate rule(s) 
and time limit and initiate the sharing by holding the device close to device A. Once 
the communication is established, device A will receive the share-request which needs 
to be confirmed by the receiving user. The shared rule(s) will then be added to the 
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RBACA Close 
Request denied 
App: com.android.camera 
User: NINA 
Denied Encution request 
Options: 
Switch user 
Figure 6·1: Execution request denied 
current user of the receiving device for the previously defined duration. Now, if the 
user tries to open the camera again on device A, the execution request succeeds. 
6.2 Malicious Application Uses SEND_SMS 
The second scenario involves a malicious application. As previously discussed, DR 
BACA can help to mitigate certain malicious activit ies . In recent mont hs, t here 
have been many malicious applications that primarily did one thing: periodically 
send SMS to premium numbers. Many of these applications are based on the very 
widespread Android.Fakelnstaller malware family, according to a report from McAfee 
(Ruiz, 2012). The report states t hat this malware family consists of several variants 
that all spoof popular applications such as Skype and Flash Player and upload them 
to third-party App-Markets. One good solut ion using DR BACA would be, to only 
allow SEND_SMS to t he Android Messaging application. A much more stringent 
approach is shown in Listing 4 that does not allow the SEND_SMS permission to any 
application for users with the role SECURE. 
{ 
} 
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"rules" : [ 
{ 
} 
J 
"apps" : [], 
"roles" : [ "SECURE" ], 
"permissions" : [ "SEND_SMS" ], 
"rulename" : "SMS_DENIED" , 
"allowed" : false 
"shareable" : false , 
"contexts" : [] 
Listing 4: Denied SEND_SMS policy 
This rule will prevent any application from sending SMS. Let 's assume that someone 
installed a malicious application that either directly tries t o send costly SMS or tries 
to elevate its own permissions by performing a permission re-delegation attack. In 
either case , if the current user has the SECURE role assigned to itself, t he malicious 
application will fail, because the SEND.BMS permission is globally denied. The user , 
initially not aware of this malicious behavior , will be notified by DR BACA because 
it will show a similar error window as shown in the previous scenario (6·1). The user 
can t hen take appropriate actions to remove the malicious application . 
Chapter 7 
Evaluation 
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This chapter provides the complete evaluation of our proposed DR BACA system. 
Our main focus was on systems effectiveness , efficiency and usability. We evaluated 
the effectiveness by surveying recent malware (see Table 7.1 for the list of analyzed 
mal ware as well as their sources) and discuss possible mitigation techniques using 
DR BACA. We tested the efficiency of DR BACA by running several performance 
experiments. One of the experiments compares the overhead of our own permission 
checker and compares it to Android's own reference monitor overhead. We ran several 
automated long-term performance tests to get an idea of t he energy consumption 
impact of DR BACA, especially in respect to the battery life time. Finally, we 
discuss the usability of our proposed solut ion for end users. All data used for the 
following experiments is available in the research repository at: 
http:j /met-mobile. bu. edujsvn/repo /felix/ evaluation 
7.1 Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of DR BACA really depends on the security policy used. However , 
a stringent security policy can severely limit danger originating from malicious , as 
well as vulnerable non-malicious, applications. As shown in the previous scenarios, 
if a careful user prevents potentially costly permissions for all but the most trusted 
applications, malware that primarily sends hidden SMS to premium numbers are 
effectively taken care of. 
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While Table 7.1 is not exhaustive, it shows that the majority of current Android 
malware contains similar functionality. Because of this, adding only a few restrictive 
rules to DR BACA is enough to properly protect an Android mobile device. For exam-
ple: most malware has the ability to impose costs to the mobile device user by sending 
costly SMS to premium numbers. By defining a similar rule as we did in the previous 
scenarios , these types of malware effectively become useless. Also , many types of 
malware steal contact information. A rule that only grants the READ_CONTACTS 
to trusted applications will mitigate the risks posed by these particular malicious 
applications. 
Name Malicious activity Discovered date 
Bill Shocker (Saita, 2013) Send costly SMS January 2013 
Android.D DoS.1. origin (Protalin- Bot net (DDoS) & December 2012 
ski , 2012) Send costly SMS 
Android. Enesol u ty (Yamamoto, Steal personal info September 2012 
2012b) 
Android.Jifake (Cai, 2012) Send costly SMS July 2012 
Android.Ackposts (Yamamoto , Steal contact info July 2012 
2012a) 
Android.Mobiletx (Ballano, Steal personal info & May 2012 
2012) Send costly SMS 
Android.Rufraud (Xie, 2011) Send costly SMS December 2011 
Android.FakeDoc (Sophos , 2011) Install additional November 2011 
packages 
Android.BeanBot (Jiang, 2011) Steal personal info & October 2011 
Send costly SMS 
Android. Base bridge (Doherty Send costly SMS June 2011 
and Krysiuk, 2011) 
Table 7.1 : Recent Android malware 
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7. 2 Efficiency 
Added security always comes with a price , be it through performance degradation , 
slowed down user experience, higher battery life consumption or a combination of 
all. With the current mobile devices on the market, one of the most important 
performance factors is the battery life time. This is illustrated by the fact that the 
Galaxy Nexus battery takes up about ~ of the entire internal hardware. Based on 
our own user experience with the Galaxy Nexus, its battery lasts between one to two 
days, depending on how intensively the device is used. 
We performed several efficiency tests to analyze how DR BACA affects the mobile 
device it is running on. In order to perform reproducible results , we performed all 
tests using a fictitious company of which the organization chart is shown in Figure 
7·1. 
Figure 7-l : Company organization chart used for evaluation 
All tests in this chapter were performed with user Nina. The following DR BACA 
rules apply to this user: 
• Internet denied (all applications) during work days , office hours and at office 
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location; 
• Send_SMS denied (all applications) during work days; 
• Execute music application denied during work days and office hours; 
• Execute performance application denied; 
• Execute settings application denied during work days; 
• Execute camera application denied during work days, office hours and at office 
location; 
• Internet allowed for email application; 
• Internet allowed for performance application; 
• Execute performance application allowed . 
The complete security policy used during evaluation is shown in Appendix B. For 
clarity's sake, we kept the security policy for this chapter small. However , the provided 
results are still representative for larger environments (with dozens of users, roles and 
rules) for the following reasons: 
• Once a user is logged in , only that user 's roles, rules and contexts are loaded 
into memory and used by DR BACA to make access decisions. Therefore, even 
if the security policy consists of hundreds of different users , the amount of roles, 
rules and contexts to verify do not increase with the number of users. 
• Roles , rules and contexts are stored in ArrayLists. In J ava, ArrayLists have a 
random access time complexity of O(n) (Oracle, 2013) , where n is the number 
of elements in the ArrayList. This means that only for a very large n will 
the results shown in this chapter be distorted. Based on the fact t hat t he 
Android operating system currently contains 130 permissions (Google , 2013b), 
we expect that normal DR BACA users will have limited amounts of roles, rules 
and contexts, unlikely to exceed a few dozens. 
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7.2.1 Permission checking overhead 
This first test evaluated individual permission requests and the time overhead intro-
duced for checking them with DR BACA. The majority of permission requests are 
handled identically by the Android system. The few exceptions are explained in Sec-
tion 5. 1. The READ_SMS permission is a good fit to perform the permission checking 
overhead test, because that permission can easily be triggered programmatically. The 
result of our performance test is shown in Figure 7·2. 
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Figure 7·2: READ_SMS request time overhead 
For this test , we t imed a total of 110 READ_SMS requests and removed the 
top and bottom 5 results, leaving 100 time values for comparison between Android 's 
reference monitor and DR BACA. Each red square in the figure indicates an individual 
permission request check performed by DR BACA. Likewise, each blue circle indicates 
the time required for Android 's reference monitor to make an access decision for the 
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same request. The result shows that DR BACA's permission checking function takes 
on average twice as long as Androids own reference monitor. Research such as (Miller, 
1968), (Shneiderman, 1984) and (Nielsen, 1993) has shown, that users who interact 
with a computer system find a response time of one to two seconds acceptable and a 
response time of 0.1 seconds or less is considered instantaneous. The time overhead 
introduced by DR BACA ranges from 400 to 800 J.LS. Adding this to Android 's own 
(highest) permission checking overhead of 630 J..LS, the overall overhead for a single 
permission check is 1430 Jl.S or 1.43 ms. This response time is well below the 0.1 
seconds that users perceive as an instantaneous response. DR BACA's overhead will 
therefore not negatively affect the user experience. 
7.2.2 GPS Overhead 
During the evaluation of DR BACA, it became apparent that retrieving GPS signals 
for the location context is one of the costlier functions DR BACA supports when 
it comes to performance overhead. For this reason , we first compared the battery 
consumption for different GPS retrieval periods. Figure 7·3 shows the result s of this 
comparison. The "No GPS" configuration never requests a GPS update whereas the 
other configurations request GPS updates in certain intervals. 
The figure shows, that compared to the "NO GPS" configuration, retrieving a GPS 
update every five minutes only has a minor effect on the battery life. However, the 
difference in battery life between a five minute interval and a one minute interval is 
considerable. If a new GPS signal is requested every minute, the Android device runs 
out of battery after only 480 minutes or 8 hours. However, when a GPS update is 
only requested every five minutes, the battery lasts 760 minutes or 12 hours and 40 
minutes, which is a difference in battery life time of 37 %. 
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Figure 7·3: GPS performance cost comparison 
7.2.3 Long-term DR BACA Test 
As previously mentioned , the battery life time is a crucial aspect of today's mobile 
devices. With the purpose of understanding how much of an impact DR BACA has 
on battery life time, we ran a long-term performance test. In order to automate 
testing and generate reproducible results , we created a user simulation application 
that starts and continues predefined applications in given intervals, as explained in 
Chapter 5. 7. This simulation is an approximation of an actual user and provides some 
important estimates of how much DR BACA affects the mobile device's battery life 
time. Table 7.2 shows the applications that were involved in this test as well as the 
time (in minutes) when the applications were executed. 
Every thirty minutes , the execution of these applications was repeated . The perfor-
mance test compared the battery consumption of an unmodified Android 4.0.4 system 
with a DR BACA-enabled Android 4.0.4 system. Each performance test was started 
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Package name Executed at (min.) 
com. android. browser 0 
com. android. email 2 
com. android. camera 3 
com. android . calendar 5 
bu.met.localpolicy 7 
com. android . settings 8 
com. android . camera 11 
com. android. browser 13 
com. android. calendar 17 
bu.met.localpolicy 20 
com.android.calculator2 22 
com. android . browser 23 
com . android. gallery3d 24 
com. android. videoedi tor 25 
bu.met.localpolicy 26 
com. android . contacts 27 
com . android. music 28 
com .google. android. talk 29 
Table 7.2 : Long-term performance test applications 
with the following settings: 
• User: Nina (not applicable to the t est without DR BACA) ; 
• Date: April 15th 2013; 
• Time: 9am ; 
• Location: Medford , MA 20155 ; 
• GPS request period: 5 minutes (not applicable to the test without DR BACA). 
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Figure 7·4 shows the results of this performance t est by comparing the following three 
configurations: 
• No DR BACA: This configuration uses an unmodified Android 4.0.4 system 
without the modifications int roduced by DR BACA; 
• DR BACA Policy A : In this configuration , DR BACA is enabled and uses 
the security policy shown in Appendix B; 
• DR BACA Policy B : In this configuration , DR BACA is enabled and uses 
t he security policy shown in Appendix B, except that all rules are allowed 
at all times. Therefore, this configuration can be directly compared to t he 
configuration wit hout DR BACA, which by default allows the execut ion of every 
application as well . 
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Figure 7·4: Battery life time test 
Running t his user simulation t est , t he configuration wit hout DR BACA last s for 720 
minutes , which equals to 12 hours. Interestingly, t he configuration with DR BACA 
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using policy A lasts 30 minutes longer. The reason for this is , that the security policy 
used in this configuration rejects many of the applications from starting, preventing 
them from using up resources, which in turn preserves battery life. While this result 
does not inform us about the additional performance overhead introduced by DR 
BACA, it shows that depending on the security policy chosen, DR BACA could 
actually help to preserve the battery life of Android devices. The configuration with 
DR BACA using policy B indicates the actual performance overhead of using the DR 
BACA syst em . This configuration lasts for 660 minutes, or 11 hours. Compared to 
the configuration without DR BACA, the battery life time is reduced by 8.4 %. This 
reduction includes the overhead of receiving a new GPS signal every 5 minutes. In a 
company environment , one reasonable requirement of DR BACA would b e that the 
device's battery lasts at least an entire workday of eight to nine hours. As shown, a DR 
BACA-enabled mobile device does fulfill this requirement. In such an environment, 
the negative effect on the battery life time introduced by DR BACA stays within an 
acceptable range. It should also be noted , that DR BACA in its current development 
stage has not yet been optimized for performance. 
7.3 Usability 
The main focus of DR BACA is on effectiveness and efficiency. However , the usability 
of any security system is also an important factor. The following points illustrate why 
DR BACA is easy to use and configure. 
• DR BACA provides three different ways of creating or modifying the underly-
ing security policy, depending on the users needs . The likely most convenient 
way is to create the security policy on the configuration server through a web 
interface. The second way is through a Java program which offers a very simple 
API that can be called from different programs. The third way to create or 
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modify a security policy is on the mobile device itself. While this method is 
less convenient , it is suitable for users who do not wish to setup a dedicated 
configuration server, especially if only one device is involved. 
• DR BACA provides only one system application on the mobile device that 
incorporates all the functionality required by the end user or administrator. 
This application provides functionalities to create/modify the security policy, 
initiate NFC transfer (device---+ device) and retrieve a security policy from the 
configuration server. 
• Normally, if a permission or execution request is denied , the user will be notified 
by a pop-up window. This extra pop-up window can potentially bother end 
users. The security policy allows deactivating these error windows and replace 
them with a simple message informing the user that a given request was denied 
by DR BACA. Each company can therefore decide for itself, how to deal with 
this issue. 
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The popularity of Android as a mobile device OS combined with the tremendous 
increase in Android malware has led many security researchers to propose new security 
solutions to mitigate some of the vulnerabilities Android is susceptible to. 
Probably the work most closely related to our own is a solution called CRePE 
(Conti et al., 2011). CRePE stands for context-related policy enforcement for Android 
and can be used to define fine-grained policies , even after the installation process. 
CRePE focusses on restricting the capabilities of non-malicious applications based 
on current context information such as the phones location (GPS) and the time of 
day (internal clock). DR BACA provides the same level of access control , while 
providing a simplified way of configuring dozens or hundreds of devices through our 
external configuration server, as explained in Section 4.1.5. In addition , DR BACA 
introduces a dynamic approach to role-based access control through the use of near 
field communication (NFC) technology. Conti et al. does not provide a centralized 
configuration server nor does it make use of NFC. 
Yee and Thein proposed a framework for a role-based access control model for 
Android smartphones (Yee and Thein, 2011). Very much like DR BACA, the proposed 
framework consists of subjects (admin, user) , objects (camera, video) and contexts 
(time, location) . However, DR BACA extends on most of the ideas proposed by Thiri. 
In particular , the paper does not seem to take multiple users (apart from an admin 
and a standard user) into account, which is one of the contributions of DR BACA. 
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In 'Understanding Android Security' (Enck et al., 2009), Enck gives an introduc-
tion to Android security and point out potential security issues that developers need 
to be aware of. One example is the usage of implicit intents when explicit intents 
would be more appropriate. An implicit intent does no~ specify which application 
(App) should receives the intent, while an explicit intent requires a specific App to 
receive it. In the case of an App-internal intent, explicit intents are a more secure 
choice. Enck et al. further discuss , how a malicious App may be eavesdropping on 
misconfigured broadcasts. 
Saint (Ongtang et al., 2011) enhances the Android security model by providing 
install-time permission granting policies as well as runtime inter-application commu-
nication policies. The install-time policy can include rules such as the following: only 
grant permission X to applications that own permission Y (i.e. ACCESS_FINKLO-
CATION). A example of a run-time policy is the following: An application X with 
permission Y cannot interact with any application that contains permission Z. 
The security of Android can also be improved by strengthening the Linux kernel 
itself through the addition of SELinux (Shabtai et al., 2010). SELinux for Android 
enforces stronger security policies on the kernel level, such as type enforcement and a 
limited form of role-based access control. SELinux further protects the system from 
compromised system applications running with root privileges. 
Several papers aim to mitigate the very common permission re-delegation (PRD) 
attack. IPC Inspection (Felt et al., 2011) dynamically mitigates this attack by cal-
culating the intersection of the calling and called applications permission sets. If the 
intersection does not contain the requested permission, the request will be denied. 
Another solution is called TrustDroid (Bugiel et al., 2011 b) which mitigates PRD at-
tacks by dividing applications into a trusted and an untrusted domain. Applications 
from the untrusted domain are not allowed to communicate with applications from 
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the trusted domain and vice versa. The authors argue that TrustDroid allows com-
panies to distinguish between their own company internal applications and others. 
This way, sensitive company information is less likely to be leaked. 
XManDroid (Bugiel et al., 2011a) is another very prominent security extension 
for Android which offers monitoring mechanisms for inter-component communication 
(ICC) at runtime. XManDroid aims to mitigate application level privilege escalation 
attacks by checking each ICC against a policy database. The policy can prevent 
applications from communicating, if the union of the permissions of both applications 
may pose a security risk. For example: an application with read access to the contacts 
database must not communicate with an application that has network access. 
Apex (Nauman et al., 2010) aims to improve the flexibility of the permission 
granting process in Android. As previously discussed , the user must normally accept 
all requested permissions at install-time or reject them all together and not install 
the application. Apex allows users to selectively deny or accept a subset of the 
permission requests. In addition, this permission subset can be changed even after 
the installation of the application. Apex also allows fine-grained access control. For 
example, a user may define that a certain application is only allowed to send 5 SMS 
per day. Such rules are not possible with Androids current permission model. 
To summarize the related work, we compare some of the proposed solutions to 
our own work in Table 8.1. 
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Name Fine-grained Configurable Scalable Context-aware 
Access Control 
DRBACA ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 
IPC Inspection X X ,/ X 
CRePE ,/ ,/ X ,/ 
Thiri 's CtRBAC ,/ ,/ X ,/ 
Saint ,/ ,/ X ,/ 
XManDroid ,/ ,/ X X 
Apex ,/ ,/ X X 
TrustDroid X X ,/ X 
SELinux ,/ ,/ X X 
Table 8.1: Comparison of security solutions 
Some of the decisions we made in Table 8.1 need further explanation: 
• A solut ion is defined as configurable if the rules it relies on can be modified 
either by the end user or the administrator. 
• If a solut ion is configurable but the authors did not mention how t heir solut ion 
could be implemented on a large scale, t he solution is not necessarily scalable. 
However, if the solut ion does not offer any configuration options, it is considered 
scalable because once installed on the device(s) , there is no need to update any 
configuration information anymore. 
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Several areas have been identified for potential future work. This section gives a brief 
overview of these options. 
9.1 DR BACA API 
A major improvement on DR BACA would be to offer an API (Application Program-
ming Interface) to application developers who could then directly take advantage of 
the underlying DR BACA system. Some preliminary work has been performed to 
evaluate the feasibility of such an API. One possible way of implementing this would 
be to allow the developers to define users, roles and rules as well as t heir association 
directly in t he applications configuration (i.e. in the AndroidManifest .:xml). During 
installation t he application , the DR BACA system could t hen add this configuration 
to t he overall security policy. 
9.2 Audit controls 
Adding audit controls to DR BACA is another area of potential future work. Audit 
controls would allow system administrators to ident ify intentional and unintentional 
security breaches . Ideally, t he audit controls would be highly configurable. At a 
minimum, security related events such as the sharing of rules or the changing or roles 
should be audited . Audit controls could even be combined with the already existing 
Configuration server in order to centralize the location of audit logs. 
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9.3 Third-party security vendor support 
A potentially useful feature would be to allow DR BACA to automatically synchronize 
its own security policy with third-party Anti-Virus vendors in order to minimize the 
exposure t ime to malicious applications. This could work in the following way: DR 
BACA could be configured to periodically check different Anti-Virus vendors. If an 
Android application is found to be malicious , the security policy of DR BACA would 
automatically be updated (i .e. prevent the execution of that application) and pushed 
to all mobile devices under this particular security policy. 
Chapter 10 
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We propose a DR BACA (Dynamic Role Based Access Control) model and fully imple-
ment it to provide flexible capabilities that enhance Android security. By applying a 
RBAC approach to Android 's existing permission model, leveraging the context-aware 
capabilities of mobile devices and utilizing the available Near Field Communication 
technology, DR BACA provides fine-grained access control through both static and 
dynamic RBAC. DR BACA offers multi-user capability and is scalable. As mobile 
devices are being widely deployed in corporations, DR BACA can support enterprises 
by simplifying the implementation and distribution of a uniform security policy on 
all involved mobile devices. With a proper security policy, DR BACA can mitigate 
security risks with very low system overhead. 
Appendix A 
DR BACA File Locations 
The following file locations are relative to the Android source folder denoted as < src>. 
Android .mk <src> / frameworks/base/ 
Application .java <src> / core/java/ android/ app 
core.mk <src> / build/ target / product 
DateTimeSettings.java <src> / packages/ apps / Settings/ src /com / android/ settings 
DRBacaManager <src> / core/java/ android/ app 
DRBaca.aidl <src> /corefjavafandroid/ os 
DRBaca Application <src> / packages/providers 
DRBacaLog.java <src> / core/java/ android/ app/ drbacaServiceHelper 
DRBacaService.java <src> / services/ java/ com/ android/server 
keyguard..screen_password_landscape.xml <src> / core/res/res/layout 
keyguard..screen_password_portrait .xml <src> / core/ res/res/layout 
LocationHolder .java <src> / core/ java/ android/ app / drbacaServiceHelper 
PackageManagerService.java <src> / services/java/ com/ android/server f pm 
P asswordUnlockScreen .java <src> / policy /src/ comf android / internal/ policy /imp! 
P erformanceTest.java <src> /core/java/ android/ app/ drbacaServiceHelper 
policy.json / dat a/system (on mobile device) 
P olicyEnforcer .java <src> /core/java/ android/ a pp 
Process.java <src> / core/javafandroid/ os 
RuleVerifier .java <src> /core/ java/ and roid / app / drbacaServiceHelper 
security ..settings_picker .xml <src> / packages/ apps/Settingsfres/xml 
Syst emServer.java <src> / services/java/ com/ android/server 
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Appendix B 
Security Policy Used During Evaluation 
{ 
"config" : { 
"rulelnterval": "60000" , 
"locationUpdate" : "300000" , 
"dateTime" : "AUTO" 
} , 
"contexts" : [ 
{ 
}, 
{ 
} , 
{ 
"times" : [ 
{ 
} 
], 
"end":17, 
"begin" : 9 
"contextname":"OFFICE_HOURS" 
"days": [ 
"MON'', 
"TUE", 
"WED" , 
"THU", 
"FRI" 
], 
"contextname" : "WORKDAYS" 
"locations": [ 
{ 
} 
"radius" : 250, 
"longitude" : -71. 103923, 
"latitude" : 42 . 406235 
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], 
"contextname":"COMPANY LOC" 
} 
], 
"users": [ 
{ 
}, 
{ 
}, 
{ 
}, 
{ 
"lastname": "bran", 
"username": "BOB", 
"pw":"c1e7fe8c01bf04b00a3e463723f0e20ce8138cd46b8b6bb5ad8a05e0cff2e31f", 
"first:Iiame": "bob", 
"roles": [ 
II EMPLOYEE II ' 
"OPERATIONS" 
"lastname": "Winslow", 
"username": "CARL", 
"pw":"6998fc071cc6bc3408f80b3fe77e70ac3064b5ef42ba2b799c8c746d01f51ce8", 
"firstname": "Carl", 
"roles": [ 
"EMPLOYEE" 
"lastname": "tsai", 
"username": "CLARE", 
"pw": "58b8de32c5ed3adebc7697f6ee80b9adeec943da3121e08a7 cec8d3657 cfa40b", 
"firstname": "clare", 
"roles": [ 
II EMPLOYEE II ' 
"FINANCE" 
"lastname": "rohrer", 
"username": "FELIX", 
"pw":"7193ba60f367a4311bfd427f8892180481b4982ed56eb812ac6613b645fb418e", 
"firstname": "felix", 
"roles": [ 
"EMPLOYEE", 
"IT" 
}, 
{ 
}, 
{ 
}, 
{ 
}, 
{ 
"lastname": "burlow", 
"username": "JAKE", 
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"pw": "5ac948daa87 cd4eb579532aeaf010ac394fd7d9bd8a176292aef1 b9a9e1e6370", 
"firstname": "jake", 
"roles": [ 
] 
II EMPLOYEE II ' 
"FINANCE" 
"lastname": "winniger", 
"username": "NINA", 
"pw": "1be4cb08253ecebea8ca804166660fab5dc11dc6b6e01f26f307e0a85dd8de77", 
"firstname": "nina", 
"roles" : [ 
"EMPLOYEE", 
"FINANCE", 
"PERFORMANCE" 
] 
"lastname": "liu", 
"username" : "OSCAR", 
"pw":"296584a0165cee9377197ab9547fa1d67ae54cded3ba6478aab2b1b636d35e25", 
"firstname": "oscar", 
"roles" : [ 
"EMPLOYEE", 
"OPERATIONS" 
"lastname": "pan", 
"username": "PETE", 
"pw" : "982d3b356701 b40827689219e0947f65a5959a50d59dd5ebd205f ab28cd331f2" , 
"firstname": "pete", 
"roles": [ 
"EMPLOYEE", 
"IT" 
], 
}, 
{ 
} ' 
{ 
}, 
{ 
} 
"lastname" : "wales", 
"username" : "PETRA" , 
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"pw" : "18ab1f8d802e45b001ec6b96208b37e0fe6eb257fea3a77c2991be34777dffff", 
"firstname" : "petra", 
"roles" : [ 
"EMPLOYEE" , 
"OPERATIONS" 
"lastname": "chang", 
"username" : "TIM", 
"pw":"ff73a9e9d0c593515d4645fd2b6c465ad7947641dbb383435cee7da1d78bb741", 
"firstname": "tim", 
"roles" : [ 
II EMPLOYEE II ' 
"IT" 
"lastname" : "jenkins" , 
"username": "TOM", 
"pw" : "3d80555eca1891e0abafbeaf10fb33745dc342e43505d834820366a7288378a8", 
"firstname" : "tom", 
"roles" : [ 
"EMPLOYEE", 
"FINANCE" 
"status" : "SUCCESS", 
"rules" : [ 
{ 
"pe~issions" : [ 
"ANDROID . PERMISSION . INTERNET" 
] ' 
"allowed" : true, 
"contexts" : [ 
], 
}, 
{ 
}, 
{ 
}, 
{ 
"shareable" :false, 
"apps": [ 
"COM.ANDROID .EMAIL" 
], 
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"rulename" : "EMAIL_INTERNET_ALLOW" 
"permissions": [ 
], 
"allowed" :false, 
"contexts" : [ 
"OFFICE_HOURS", 
"WORKDAYS", 
"COMPANY LOC" 
], 
"shareable" :false, 
"apps" : [ 
"COM.ANDROID.CAMERA" 
] , 
"rulename" : "EXEC CAMERA_DENY" 
"permissions": [ 
] , 
"allowed":false, 
"contexts": [ 
] , 
"OFFICE_HOURS", 
"WORKDAYS" 
"shareable" :false, 
"apps": [ 
"COM . ANDROID .MUSIC" 
], 
"rulename":"EXEC MUSIC_DENY" 
"permissions" : [ 
], 
"allowed":true, 
}, 
{ 
}, 
{ 
}, 
{ 
"contexts" : [ 
] . 
"shareable" :false, 
"apps" : [ 
"BU.MET.PERFTEST" 
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] . 
"rulename" : "EXEC_PERFTEST_ALLOW" 
"permissions" : [ 
], 
"allowed" :false, 
"contexts": [ 
], 
"shareable" :false, 
"apps" : [ 
"BU.MET .PERFTEST" 
] . 
"rulename" : "EXEC_PERFTEST_DENY" 
"permissions": [ 
], 
"allowed" :true, 
"contexts": [ 
] . 
"shareable" :false, 
"apps": [ 
"COM.ANDROID.SETTINGS" 
], 
"rulename":"EXEC_SETTINGS_ALLOW" 
"permissions" : [ 
], 
"allowed":false, 
} ' 
{ 
} , 
{ 
} 
"contexts" : [ 
], 
"shareable" :false, 
"apps" : [ 
"COM.ANDROID .SETTINGS" 
], 
"rulename ": "EXEC SETTINGS_DENY" 
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"permissions": [ 
"ANDROID.PERMISSION . INTERNET" 
], 
"allowed" :false , 
"contexts": [ 
], 
"OFFICE_HOURS", 
"WORKDAYS", 
"COMPANY_LOC" 
"shareable" :false, 
"apps": [ 
], 
"rulename": "PERM_INTERNET_DENY" 
"permissions": [ 
"ANDROID.PERMISSION . SEND SMS" 
], 
"allowed":false, 
"contexts" : [ 
], 
"shareable" :false, 
"apps" : [ 
], 
"rulename":"PERM SENDSMS_DENY" 
] ' 
"roles": [ 
{ 
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"rules" : [ 
"EXEC_MUSIC_DENY", 
"EXEC_PERFTEST_DENY", 
"EXEC_SETTINGS_DENY" 
] ' 
"rolename" : "EMPLOYEE" 
}, 
{ 
"rules" : [ 
"PERM_SENDSMS_DENY" 
] ' 
"rolename":"OPERATIONS" 
}, 
{ 
"rules": [ 
"EMAIL_INTERNET_ALLOW", 
"EXEC_CAMERA_DENY", 
"PERM_INTERNET_DENY", 
"PERM_SENDSMS_DENY" 
], 
"rolename" : "FINANCE" 
}, 
{ 
"rules" : [ 
"EXEC_PERFTEST_ALLOW", 
"EXEC_SETTINGS_ALLOW" 
], 
"rolename":"IT" 
}, 
{ 
"rules": [ 
"EXEC_PERFTEST_ALLOW" 
], 
"rolename":"PERFDRMANCE" 
} 
} 
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